

Text of Report by Colby in Res of Domestic Spying by C. I. A.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 15—Following is text of a report by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, responding to charges of illegal domestic surveillance by the agency, which he submitted to the Senate Appropriations Committee today:

I welcome this opportunity to appear before the Committee today to answer questions and to place in perspective a series of allegations regarding C.I.A. activities in the United States that have appeared recently in certain publications. I flatly deny the charge in *The New York Times* of Dec. 22, 1974, that "the Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the anti-war movement and other dissident groups in the United States..."

These charges impugn the integrity of a large number of people who have served this country faithfully and effectively for many years. They also damage the credibility of the C.I.A. at home and its effectiveness abroad.

Mr. Chairman, any institution—in or out of Government—that has been functioning for over a quarter of a century as the C.I.A. has) would be hard put to avoid some wrong steps. But any steps over the line in C.I.A.'s 27-year history were few and far between and wrong stemmed from a misconception of the extent of C.I.A.'s authority to carry out its important and primary mission—the collection and production of intelligence pertaining to foreign areas and developments. Certainly, at this time, it is my firm belief that all activities of the agency are within the limits of its authority.

I, therefore, welcome the opportunity this inquiry offers to restore public confidence in the C.I.A. and to make its work more effective in the future within the constraints of our Constitution and laws. The employees of the agency and I are wholly committed to being responsive to this committee in full confidence that a thorough understanding of the intelligence process of the United States and the role of the C.I.A. will:

(1) Demonstrate the value and importance of the intelligence work of the agency.

(2) Reassure you as to the general propriety and legality of the agency's activities over the years.

(3) Help you to formulate legislation to improve the procedures and arrangements that govern the agency's activities.

In this process, Mr. Chairman, we hope also to answer the charges made in *The New York Times* and other publications on this subject. I am not sure that we will answer them all, but I note that *The New York Times* has indicated its disinclination to reveal the

names of those making the charges it reported. Thus we may not be able to track down the specific situations cited to tell whether the charges were well-founded or not. You might be interested, Mr. Chairman, in a copy I am giving your staff of our reply to a request from *The New York Times* reporter that I give him all our available information on this subject under the present Freedom of Information Act. You will note that *The New York Times* and we are equally concerned with the protection of our sources. To this committee I will of course be fully responsive, and I would hope thereby not only to reassure the committee but to secure greater public and press understanding of C.I.A.'s need for protection of its sources, too.

Mr. Chairman, while it is familiar to you, I would like to take a few moments to draw a framework for your inquiry by giving a brief description of the C.I.A.—its authority under the law, its mission, and the intelligence process itself.

I shall then describe the activities of the agency which do take place within the United States to demonstrate their contribution to the foreign intelligence mission of C.I.A.

I shall follow this with a discussion of the allegations in *The New York Times* of 22 December 1974 and in subsequent articles.

I shall conclude with some suggestions that might be useful to the committee.

THE C.I.A., AUTHORITY AND BACKGROUND

C.I.A.'s existence and authority rest upon the National Security Act of 1947. The act provides that the agency will "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government..."

The act calls for the agency to perform certain services of "common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally" and "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

The act provides that "the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." Those are the responsibility of the F.B.I. and other law-enforcement authorities. In its use of the term "intelligence" in connection with C.I.A. activities, thus, the act implicitly restricts C.I.A. to the field of foreign intelligence.

Another proviso is that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure..."

closure...." Incl the only Govern charged by sta ligence sources

The C.I.A. Act in order to impl and in the inte the foreign intel United States, t from the provi requires the pub the organization cial titles, salar sonnel employe

In the interv as the internati bilities of the U so has the imp to its decision- duties of the D ligence have a ularly his role : intelligence eff ment.

Intelligence t gle-dimensional an intellectual

(1) The colle raw information.

(2) Analysis of the information and development of reasoned judgments about its significance.

(3) The dissemination and presentation of these findings to those needing them.

The process involves a number of different departments and agencies which, together, we call the intelligence community.

Our "overt" collection includes, for example, monitoring public foreign radio broadcasts, press, and other publications, excerpts of which are produced by C.I.A. as a service of common concern for the other members of the community.

Other overt collection is done by State Department Foreign Service officers, Treasury Department representatives, and defense attachés abroad.

Great technological advances have revolutionized intelligence over these years. The advent of sophisticated technical collection systems has enabled us to know with certainty many things which a decade ago we were debating on the basis of bits of circumstantial evidence.

This technology has been introduced at high cost. Collection systems being employed today have required hundreds of millions of dollars and substantial numbers of people to analyze the information they deliver.

But overt and technical collection cannot collect the plans and intentions of a hostile general staff, sense the political dynamics of closed authoritarian societies, or enable us to anticipate new weapons systems during the research phase before they are completed and visible. For this, clandestine collection is essential. It is the only way to obtain information from unauthorized sources.

CIA 1.01 COLBY, William

CIA 1.01 DOMESTIC SPYING

CIA 8.01 SENATE APPROPRIATIONS

CIA 2.01 DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION

CIA 2.01 FOREIGN RESOURCES DIV. (DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIV.)

CIA 2.01 OFFICE of SECURITY

CIA 2.01 COVER STAFF

CIA 4.01 LOCKHEED

CIA 2.01 RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

CIA 2.01 OFFICE of PERSONNEL

CIA 2.06.1

CIA 2.06.8

CIA 2.01 CI STAFF (counterintell. igence)

CIA 7.02 JUSTICE DEPT.

CIA 3.01.6

(orig under COLBY)

continued